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ABSTRACT
In a series of inconsistent decisions by the Singapore courts on contract
formation in continuing negotiations cases, Lord Denning’s broad approach—
which does away with the traditional offer and acceptance analysis—appears
to have been simultaneously adopted and rejected. This article suggests that
the continued uncertainty in Singapore regarding the scope of application of
the traditional approach and Lord Denning’s approach arises from a
conflation of both as being substantially similar. This article further argues
that both approaches are conceptually and practically distinct. A better way
forward for Singapore law in the area of contract formation in continuing
negotiations cases, having regard to developments in English law and a
comparative study of various approaches taken in international instruments
and jurisdictions around the world, is to affirm the traditional approach as the
default rule, subject to displacement in exceptional situations.
ARTICLE HISTORY Received 13 March 2017; Accepted 30 June 2017
KEYWORDS Contract formation; offer and acceptance; continuing negotiations; Singapore
1. Introduction
The Singapore courts, in determining questions of contract formation, have
espoused the importance of ensuring that the ‘reasonable expectations of
honest men are not disappointed’.1 To this end, it is well-established that
the test of agreement is an objective one.2 However, in the sphere of
determining whether an agreement has been reached in the face of continu-
ing negotiations, the principles of law in Singapore relating to what constitu-
tes an objective intention to contract are not as clear and well-settled as
desired.
© 2017 Faculty of Law, Oxford University
CONTACT Chia Ming Lee chiaming.lee@dentons.com
1Tribune Investment Trust Inc v Soosan Trading Co Ltd [2000] 2 SLR(R) 407 (Singapore Court of Appeal
(SGCA)) [40].
2The objective test of agreement is in fact partly objective and partly subjective: Aircharter World Pte Ltd v
Kontena Nasional Bhd [1999] 2 SLR(R) 440 (SGCA) [32]. See also Andrew Phang Boon Leong (gen ed), The
Law of Contract in Singapore (Academy Publishing 2012) paras 03.006–14.
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The conventional starting point is that ‘the concepts of offer and
acceptance constitute the objective manifestations of an intention to con-
tract’.3 Offer and acceptance have thus traditionally been the tools of analysis
to ascertain if a contract has been validly formed4 (the traditional approach).
However, this analysis arguably does not lend itself easily to application in
continuing negotiations cases. Such cases typically involve a convoluted
course of negotiation between the parties regarding the terms of their agree-
ment, which eventually results in parties undertaking performance.5 This
renders it potentially difficult to identify a clear instance of offer and accep-
tance in order to define whether there was an agreement at all and on
what terms. Battle of the forms cases may well be said to overlap with or to
constitute a sub-set of this category: such cases occur where parties exchange
standard form contracts with substantially different terms and subsequently
fall into disagreement as to whose standard terms govern the agreement
between them.
Due to these difficulties, the traditional approach was rejected by Lord
Denning in favour of an approach that simply calls on the court to
examine the whole of the documents in the case and decide from themwhether
the parties did reach an agreement upon all material terms in such circum-
stances that the proper inference is that they agreed to be bound by those
terms from that time onwards.6 (Lord Denning’s approach)
To the extent that Lord Denning’s approach did away with the long-standing
concepts of offer and acceptance, this represented a departure from the pre-
vailing jurisprudence on contract formation.7
Lord Denning’s approach has been frowned upon by the English courts
and its scope of application has been narrowed significantly to only rare
and exceptional situations.8 In contrast, a survey of Singaporean jurisprudence
reveals that the position in Singapore is far murkier in the realm of contract
formation concerning continuing negotiation scenarios. The Singapore
Court of Appeal (SGCA), which is the highest court of the land, has on separate
occasions endorsed and rejected Lord Denning’s approach when determining
agreement in the face of continuing negotiations between parties. In a series
of seemingly irreconcilable decisions, Singapore courts have also given
3Phang (n 2) para 03.006.
4Phang (n 2) para 03.006.
5Where the continuing negotiations are broken off and do not result in performance, the issue becomes
whether good faith obligations are engaged. Such cases are not the subject of this article.
6Port Sudan Cotton Co v Govindaswamy Chettiar & Sons [1977] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 5 (UK Court of Appeal (UKCA))
10. See also Butler Machine Tool Co Ltd v Ex-Cell-O Corporation (England) Ltd [1979] 1 All ER 965, [1979] 1
WLR 401 (UKCA), 404; Gibson v Manchester City Council [1978] 1 WLR 520 (UKCA) (Gibson (CA)), 523–24.
7Hugh Beale (gen ed), Chitty on Contracts, vol 1 (32nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2015) para 2-118 character-
ises Lord Denning’s approach as an ‘outright rejection’ of the traditional approach.
8See Gibson v Manchester City Council [1979] 1 WLR 294, 297 (UK House of Lords (UKHL)) (Gibson (HL)). See
also Tekdata Interconnections Ltd v Amphenol Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 1209.
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differing pronouncements on the applicable approach and at times have
endorsed Lord Denning’s approach but applied the traditional approach.
Thus the case law in Singapore on contract formation evinces a continued
tension between the traditional approach and Lord Denning’s approach,
with considerable uncertainty as to the relationship between both
approaches and the continued applicability of Lord Denning’s approach.
This article suggests that the troubling state of law in Singapore is attribu-
table to the local courts’ conflation of both the traditional approach and Lord
Denning’s approach as being substantially similar. In contrast to the prevail-
ing judicial attitude in Singapore, it is argued that both approaches are con-
ceptually and practically distinct. This piece assesses the relative merits of
both approaches with reference to a variety of factors (such as the ability
to cohere with existing principles of contract law, give effect to parties’ inten-
tions, and provide certainty in commercial relationships). The article then
suggests, having regard to recent developments in English law9 in this
area and a comparative study of different approaches taken by international
instruments and various jurisdictions around the world, that the best way
forward for the development of Singapore law is to affirm the application
of the traditional approach as the default framework for finding agreement
in continuing negotiation situations, but to allow the courts in exceptional
situations to displace this approach with a broader inquiry directed at
the parties’ intentions as evinced through their overall conduct and
correspondence.
2. Background
It is a well-established principle of contract law that contractual formation is
determined objectively. However, two competing approaches exist in the
application of the objective test.
2.1. The traditional approach
Parties’ intentions have traditionally been determined through the twin con-
cepts of offer and acceptance.10 It is a trite principle of law that: (a) an offer is
‘an expression of willingness to contract on specified terms made with the
intention (actual or apparent) that it is to become binding as soon as it is
accepted by the person to whom it is addressed’; (b) an acceptance means
‘a final and unqualified expression of assent to the terms of an offer’; and
(c) no agreement is formed if the reply attempts to vary the offer terms or
9It is worth noting that the Singapore legal system has traditionally had its roots in English law; even today,
as Singapore seeks to grow an autochthonous body of law, Singapore courts continue to rely heavily on
the English position as persuasive authority.
10Phang (n 2) para 03.006.
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introduces new terms.11 This approach has been described as the ‘mirror
image’ rule for finding existence of an agreement.12
2.2. Lord Denning’s approach
However, in a series of three judgments Lord Denning espoused an alternative
interpretation of the objective test.
The first judgment was the English Court of Appeal (UKCA) decision of
Port Sudan Cotton Co v Govindaswamy Chettiar & Sons.13 The buyers of
cotton disagreed with a provision in the sellers’ contracts of purchase
which specified India as the only destination of the cotton, and cabled
the sellers to clarify whether the cotton could be shipped to other ports.
The sellers agreed by cable that they would ship the cotton to other
ports provided that the payment was made in foreign currency. Satisfied,
the buyers returned the signed contracts to the sellers, but neglected to
amend the ‘Destination India’ provision in the contracts. Subsequently the
sellers refused to ship to destinations other than India, although the evi-
dence showed that the sellers were constrained by restrictions imposed
by the authorities, but otherwise considered themselves bound by contract
to ship to other destinations.
Applying the traditional approach, Lord Justice Browne held that the
sellers’ cable was a counter-offer which the buyers accepted by returning
the signed contracts; however, the signed contracts must be read with the
cables, such that there was a contract on terms of the signed contracts as
modified by the cables. With respect, the interpretation taken by Browne LJ
appears to be somewhat artificial—it is arguable that no contract ought to
have been found because the purported acceptance was not a mirror
image of the counter-offer. This artificiality, coupled with the Court’s reluc-
tance to decide that there was no contract where businessmen had already
acted on the basis that there was a contract between them, could have
been the trigger for Lord Denning to depart from the traditional approach
and to espouse his first formulation of his novel approach to formation:
In considering this question, I do not much like the analysis in the text-books of
inquiring whether there was an offer and acceptance, or a counter-offer, and so
forth. I prefer to examine the whole of the documents in the case and decide
from them whether the parties did reach an agreement upon all material
terms in such circumstances that the proper inference is that they agreed to
be bound by those terms from that time onwards.14
11Beale (n 7) paras 2-003, 2-026, 2-031.
12Corneill A Stephens, ‘Escape from the Battle of the Forms: Keep It Simple, Stupid’ (2007) 11 Lewis & Clark
Law Review 233, 237.
13Port Sudan Cotton (n 6).
14Port Sudan Cotton (n 6) 10. Notably Lord Denning, applying his wider approach, arrived at the same con-
clusion at which Browne LJ applying the traditional approach did.
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Applying this principle to the facts in Port Sudan Cotton, Lord Denning
reached the same conclusion but on the basis that the sellers’ cable agreeing
to ship to other ports was ‘obviously acceptable’15 to the buyers, so there was
no need for the buyers to speciﬁcally cable their agreement.
Lord Denning next applied this approach in Butler Machine Tool Co Ltd v
Ex-Cell-O Corporation (England) Ltd.16 The essence of the dispute in Butler
Machine was whether a price variation clause was part of the terms of the con-
tract. The seller’s quotation included the price variation clause, but this was
missing in the buyer’s order form. The buyer’s order form included a tear-
off acknowledgement form stating that a signature and return accepted the
terms and conditions thereon. The seller duly returned the acknowledgement
form, but with a cover letter stating that delivery would be in accordance to
the terms in the original quotation. When the seller invoked the price variation
clause to claim a price increase due to a delay in the buyer’s acceptance of the
delivery, the buyer argued that the clause was not part of the contract. The
key issue before the CA was when the contract was concluded, and on
what terms.
Plainly there were discrepancies between the documents exchanged by
parties that would pose difficulties to the ‘mirror image’ rule under the tra-
ditional approach. Yet a finding of no contract would have been a setback
to parties’ commercial expectations, given that the machine had already
been built on the basis that the contract subsisted. The majority, applying
the traditional analysis, held that a contract had indeed been reached on
the buyers’ terms, as the seller’s return of the acknowledgment form had
the effect of accepting the buyer’s counter-offer without the price variation
clause. Therefore, the seller’s accompanying cover letter had no contractual
effect.17 While one may argue that the majority had simply made an evidential
finding that the seller had objectively accepted the buyer’s terms and given
up on the price variation clause when he returned the acknowledgement
form, resulting in a mirror image, in truth, the majority had to utilise ‘a
rather strained interpretation of the facts’ to find agreement.18 This may
have been the reason that Lord Denning once again declined to apply the tra-
ditional approach, declaring that it was ‘out of date’ for such cases. He advo-
cated that the better way would be to glean from all the documents and from
parties’ conduct ‘whether they have reached agreement on all material
points—even though there may be differences between the forms and con-
ditions printed on the back of them’.19 Applying this wider approach, Lord
Denning held that considering the documents as a whole, the crucial
15Port Sudan Cotton (n 6) 10.
16Butler Machine (n 6).
17Butler Machine (n 6) 406 (Lawton J) 408 (Bridge LJ).
18Ewan McKendrick, Contract Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (6th edn, OUP 2014) 87.
19Butler Machine (n 6) 404.
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document was the seller’s acknowledgement of the buyer’s order form. Thus
he was of the view that this document made it clear that the contract was on
the buyer’s terms, which did not include the price variation clause.
The final case in which Lord Denning had the opportunity to elaborate
upon his approach to contract formation was the CA decision in Gibson v Man-
chester City Council.20 At issue was whether a contract had been concluded
between two parties who had engaged in continuing negotiations. In decid-
ing the applicable principles for this case, Lord Denning reiterated that there
was no need to look for strict offer and acceptance; rather, if the correspon-
dence and parties’ conduct showed an agreement on all material terms
that was intended to be binding, that sufficed to form a binding contract in
law.21 Applying this principle to the facts, Lord Denning held that the corre-
spondence between the parties, together with their subsequent conduct,
showed that ‘the parties were agreed and intended the agreement to be
binding’.22 His Lordship held that it was plain that the parties had agreed to
all material terms and thus found that there was a concluded contract
which could support an order of specific performance.
The preceding cases demonstrate that Lord Denning’s approach to con-
tract formation broadens the scope of enquiry that the court takes in deter-
mining whether a contract has been formed. It has been pointed out that
the ‘mirror image’ rule under the traditional analysis tends to result in the con-
clusion that there is no contract, given that discrepancies can frequently be
found between each side’s terms, which may be contrary to parties’ expec-
tations particularly if they have already acted on the supposed contract.23
Instead of taking an arguably technical interpretation of whether the facts
fit within the strict framework of offer and acceptance, particularly in cases
where it may have been felt that a finding of no contract would have defeated
parties’ legitimate commercial expectations, Lord Denning advocated a more
flexible examination of the correspondence between the parties and their
conduct to determine if there had been agreement on all material terms.
Thus, Lord Denning’s approach represents a departure from the traditional
approach to the extent that it reduces the significance of the concepts of
offer and acceptance as tools of analysis in contract formation. At this
point, it suffices to note that Lord Denning’s approach was formulated
mainly in the context of situations where the traditional analysis may not
have lent itself easily to application, such as continuing negotiations (includ-
ing battle of the forms) cases. Lord Denning’s approach may thus be seen as a
reaction to the perceived rigidity of the traditional approach. The conceptual
20Gibson (CA) (n 6).
21Gibson (CA) (n 6) 523–24.
22Gibson (CA) (n 6) 524.
23McKendrick (n 18) 86.
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distinctions between Lord Denning’s approach and the traditional approach
will be explored in Section 4 of this article.
2.3. The present position in English law on Lord Denning’s approach
Lord Denning’s proposal of a broader approach to contract formation has not
found favour in the English courts. It first met with stern disapproval when the
decision in Gibson (CA)was appealed to the House of Lords. In overturning the
CA’s decision, Lord Diplock in Gibson v Manchester City Council24 asserted that
‘it was by departing from this conventional approach [the traditional
approach] that the majority of the Court of Appeal was led into error’.25
More recently, the CA in Tekdata Interconnections Ltd v Amphenol Ltd26 con-
fined Lord Denning’s approach to the rare and exceptional situation where
there was a very clear course of dealing between the parties which showed
that the parties intended some other terms to apply—terms which would
not have been part of the contract if the traditional approach were to be
adopted.
There has been academic suggestion that Lord Denning’s approach has
found favour in the UK Supreme Court (SC) decision of RTS Flexible Systems
Ltd v Molkerei Alois Muller GmbH & Co KG27 (RTS Flexible Systems) (a decision
which was published shortly after but without reference to Tekdata) on the
basis that the Court did not identify any particular words or actions constitut-
ing offer and acceptance, but looked at the entire evidence to decide that
essential agreement had been reached.28 Respectfully, RTS Flexible Systems
is at best weak authority for such a proposition, for two reasons. First, the
specific inquiry before the court was the effect of the ‘subject to contract’
clause on the existence of agreement. As a matter of law, ‘subject to contract’
clauses raise difficulties relating to completeness of agreement and intention
to create legal relations.29 RTS Flexible Systems involved a draft contract that
was ‘subject to contract’, although no contract was eventually executed. It
was in this connection that the court held that if matters had ended there,
the draft contract would not be binding because of the ‘subject to contract’
clause—and not because the parties had not reached agreement—although
24Gibson (HL) (n 8).
25Gibson (HL) (n 8) 297.
26Tekdata (n 8) 302.
27[2010] UKSC 14.
28Richard Stone, ‘Forming Contracts without Offer and Acceptance, Lord Denning and the Harmonisation
of English Contract Law’ [2012] 4 Web Journal of Current Legal Issues <www.bailii.org/uk/other/
journals/WebJCLI/2012/issue4/stone4.html> accessed 27 February 2017.
29Edwin Peel (ed), Treitel on the Law of Contract (14th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2015) (Peel 2015) para 4-009:
‘An agreement may be made “subject to contract”, either expressly, or by implication. Such an agree-
ment is incomplete until the details of a formal contract have been settled and approved by the
parties’; Beale (n 7) para 2–125: ‘Agreements “subject to contract“ are normally regarded as incomplete
until the terms of a formal contract have been settled and approved by the parties’.
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on the particular facts a binding contract was found nonetheless.30 Secondly,
the SC did not address itself to any question of how the traditional approach
and Lord Denning’s approach should apply, which one would have expected
had the court been minded to overrule the clear endorsement of the
traditional approach as set out in Gibson (HL).
It is also significant that the English High Court in the recent decision of
Caroline Gibbs v Lakeside Developments Ltd31 did not perceive RTS Flexible
Systems as adopting Lord Denning’s approach. RTS Flexible Systems was first
cited as authority for the proposition that the court ought to look at the
entire correspondence to determine if a contract has been concluded in the
course of correspondence. The Court then applied the offer and acceptance
framework to determine whether a contract had so been concluded on the
entire correspondence. Thus, the traditional approach was considered the
right one to continue to apply.
With this background, we turn to examine how the Singapore courts
have—inconsistently—applied and rationalised both the traditional approach
and Lord Denning’s approach.
3. Analysis of the inconsistencies in Singapore case law
Singapore courts have generally applied the traditional approach to deter-
mine the existence of agreement, whether in continuing negotiations cases
or otherwise. The SGCA abruptly and decisively departed from this pattern
in an important decision, Projection Pte Ltd v Tai Ping Insurance32 (Projection).
This was the first case to endorse and apply Lord Denning’s approach in
Singapore. Yet less than a decade later, the SGCA in Gay Choon Ing v Loh
Sze Ti Terence Peter33 (Gay Choon Ing) disapproved of Lord Denning’s
approach and signalled that the traditional approach should apply. Curiously,
the SGCA made no reference to Projection. It also went on to comment that
the traditional approach and Lord Denning’s approach were substantially
similar. Thus, in the wake of Projection and Gay Choon Ing, both approaches
remain potentially applicable in Singapore law and, as a result, the state of
the law in this area continues to lack certainty and clarity.
3.1. Projection and its associated difficulties
Projection concerned an insurer and insured party who were involved in con-
tinuing negotiations over the quantum of insurance payout, in the course of
which the parties entered into oral negotiations for a settlement sum. During
30RTS Flexible Systems (n 27) [60], [61].
31[2016] EWHC 2203 (Ch).
32[2001] SGCA 28.
33[2009] SGCA 3.
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the negotiations, the insured requested that the settlement sum be increased
to S$553,560.98 but the insurer was unwilling to agree. Several weeks later,
the insurer wrote to the insured, referring to the previous discussion, and
agreeing to adjust the sum payable to S$553,560.98. The letter enclosed a dis-
charge form which the insured duly signed and returned. The insurer later
denied that any compromise agreement had been entered into and
claimed that even if its letter constituted an offer, it had not been accepted
in accordance with its terms. The central issue was thus whether an
agreement had been reached between the parties. The SGCA found that
there was an agreement as the receipt of the insurer’s letter signalled that
parties had arrived at a clear compromise on the settlement amount to be
paid.34 The discharge voucher was simply an acknowledgment and its
execution could not have an effect on the validity or existence of the
agreement.35
In reaching its decision, the SGCA observed that it is settled law that the
objective test is applied in determining if the parties have reached agree-
ment.36 However, the SGCA then went on to assert more controversially
that ‘the parties were involved in continuing negotiations… over a period
of time. In such cases, the traditional analysis of offer and acceptance is not
really helpful in determining the true position’.37 The SGCA then took the
opportunity to affirm Lord Denning’s approach as stated in Port Sudan
Cotton and Butler Machine. The Court also cited a passage from A G Guest
(gen ed), Chitty on Contracts, vol 1 (27th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 1994) (Chitty
on Contracts 1994) as expressing a ‘similar view’38 to Lord Denning’s
approach:
Continuing negotiations. When parties carry on lengthy negotiations, it may be
hard to say exactly when an offer has been made and accepted. As negotiations
progress, each party may make concessions or new demands and the parties
may in the end disagree as to whether they had ever agreed at all. The court
must then look at the whole correspondence and decide whether, on its true con-
struction, the parties had agreed to the same terms. If so, there is a contract even
though both parties, or one of them, had reservations not expressed in the
correspondence.39
How should the effect of Projection on Singapore law be interpreted? One
might conceivably postulate that the SGCA did not reject the traditional analy-
sis entirely but was merely encouraging a less rigid way of applying it by
looking at the entire context of negotiations. This view is unconvincing for
34Projection (n 32) [20].
35Projection (n 32) [21].
36Projection (n 32) [15].
37Projection (n 32) [16].
38Projection (n 32) [18].
39A G Guest (gen ed), Chitty on Contracts, vol 1 (27th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 1994) para 2-017 (emphasis by
the court in Projection). See also the equivalent passage in Beale (n 7) para 2-027.
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two reasons. First, from the language of the judgment,40 the SGCA clearly
regarded the approaches as alternatives, of which Denning’s approach
ought to be preferred as it was ostensibly more helpful than the traditional
analysis in continuing negotiations cases. There was also no discussion of bal-
ancing or harmonising both approaches, as one would have otherwise
expected. Secondly, the factual analysis was substantially aligned with Lord
Denning’s approach, instead of reﬂecting an inquiry to determine the pres-
ence of offer and acceptance.41
Therefore, the better view is that the SGCA was introducing the appli-
cation of Lord Denning’s approach to continuing negotiations cases as an
alternative to the traditional framework in Singapore law.42 It is surprising,
however, that the SGCA would endorse Lord Denning’s approach in Singa-
pore law without addressing the English authorities (which, although non-
binding, are persuasive) that had expressed grave doubts about Lord Den-
ning’s approach.43
More fundamentally, it is doubtful that proper conceptual justification
exists for the SGCA preferring Lord Denning’s approach to the traditional
approach in continuing negotiations cases. It appears that the SGCA was influ-
enced by its view that Lord Denning’s approach enjoys academic support,
given that the Court had identified the above-quoted passage from Chitty
on Contracts 1994 in support of Lord Denning’s approach. The passage
appears to have been interpreted to mean that a court ought to look at the
entire correspondence to decide whether parties had agreed upon all material
terms, without having to construe the correspondence using the offer and
acceptance framework. It is respectfully suggested that the SGCA’s interpret-
ation of this passage of Chitty on Contracts 1994 requires reconsideration. The
passage properly construed was meant to highlight the difficulty in identify-
ing the precise timing of offer and acceptance. It is preciselywithin the context
of the traditional approach that the learned author cautioned that a court
should look at the entire correspondence (and not at any one point in the
negotiations) to find agreement. Indeed, immediately following the quoted
passage, the learned author used the language of the traditional approach
in his assertion that ‘[t]he court will look at the entire course of negotiations
to decide whether an apparently unqualified acceptance did in fact conclude
the agreement’;44 this would avoid the court finding a contract based on
40Projection (n 32) [16].
41See further discussion at Subsection 4.3 below.
42Phang (n 2) at para 03.113 supports this view:
However, it should be mentioned that the Court of Approach in Projection Pte Ltd v The Tai
Ping Insurance Co Ltd did, interestingly enough, endorse the approach adopted by Lord
Denning MR in Butler Machine Tool Co Ltd v Ex-Cell-O Corp (England) Ltd.
43See Subsection 2.3 above.
44Guest (n 39) para 2-018 (emphasis added).
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what may ostensibly appear to be an agreement when viewed in isolation.
Further, the continuing negotiations cases noted in the passage from Chitty
on Contracts 199445 consistently applied the traditional analysis in construing
the entire correspondence. It is also noteworthy that continuing negotiations
cases were not listed in a separate category of cases that the learned author
regarded as exceptions to a general requirement of offer and acceptance.46
Thus it is suggested that the SGCA’s endorsement of Lord Denning’s approach
is not supportable by Chitty on Contracts 1994.
A further difficulty arises from Projection. While the SGCA preferred Lord
Denning’s approach, it did not dictate that Lord Denning’s approach must
be used to the exclusion of the traditional approach in continuing nego-
tiations cases. Therefore, Projection left open both the traditional approach
and Lord Denning’s approach as applicable options. It is unfortunate that
the SGCA did not provide guidance on the type of continuing nego-
tiations cases in which the traditional approach may continue to be appli-
cable. It is also unclear what type and extent of negotiations will amount
to a continuing negotiation situation where the choice between both
approaches must potentially be made. In sum, through the adoption of
Lord Denning’s approach based on questionable legal justifications, Projec-
tion introduced a significant degree of uncertainty into the law governing
contract formation in Singapore, at least in continuing negotiations cases.
3.2. Gay Choon Ing
After nearly a decade of intervening judicial confusion,47 an opportunity arose
in Gay Choon Ing for the SGCA to clarify the law once and for all. A key issue on
appeal was whether the parties had entered into a valid compromise agree-
ment. The parties, Loh and Gay, were business partners of a company. For
various reasons the parties’ relations soured, although they eventually
agreed in mid-October 2004 to resolve their dispute. At the end of October
2004, the parties signed a Points of Agreement (POA) for Loh to sell to Gay
certain shares held on trust. Loh (on behalf of the company) and Gay also
signed a waiver letter which provided that Gay would leave the company
with a mutual waiver of claims between Gay and the company as against
each other (Waiver Letter).
The SGCA held that a valid compromise agreement had been formed. The
contemporaneous execution of the POA and Waiver Letter, which were con-
cluded at a crucial point when the parties expressed a desire to resolve the
dispute, marked the crystallisation of the ongoing negotiations between
45Guest (n 39) para 2-017, note 94. See also Beale (n 7) para 2-027, note 146.
46Guest (n 39) para 2-079. See also Beale (n 7) para 2-117–18.
47See the cases discussed at Subsection 3.3 below.
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both parties into a legally binding agreement that settled their existing
disputes.48
In reaching this finding, the SGCA observed that the traditional approach
was ‘probably the approach that has hitherto been adopted in the Singapore
context’.49 While acknowledging that the technical nature of the traditional
approach may have prompted Lord Denning’s approach, the SGCA regarded
Lord Denning’s approach as ‘rather radical’50 and highlighted that it has been
neither adopted nor advocated by the English courts but was in fact rejected
in Gibson (HL).51 The SGCA also affirmed Lord Diplock’s observation in Gibson
(HL) that a contract made by exchanges of correspondence between parties
are not exceptional types of contract that fall out of the traditional analysis fra-
mework.52 Against this background, the SGCA expressly concluded that the
traditional approach is the correct approach to apply:
Whilst it is true that the court concerned must examine the whole course of
negotiations between the parties, this should be effected in accordance with
the concepts of offer and acceptance. What is required, however, is a less
mechanistic or dogmatic application of these concepts and this can be achieved
by having regard to the context in which the agreement was concluded. Looked
at in this light, the traditional approach is not, in substance at least, that different
from the broad approach advocated by Lord Denning.53
Gay Choon Ing has thus made clear that the traditional approach is to be
applied to construe the entire correspondence, and this is to be done with
the context of the contract being borne in mind rather than in a ‘mechanistic
or dogmatic’ fashion. Thus it provided some clariﬁcation of the correct
approach to be adopted in Singapore law. Two aspects however require
further clariﬁcation.
First, it is not clear what precisely the SGCA meant when it said that the tra-
ditional approach (when adopted in a context-sensitive manner) ‘is not, in
substance at least, that different’ from Lord Denning’s approach. Perhaps
the SGCA meant either that both approaches are conceptually similar or
that the approaches generally lead to the same practical result. With
respect, both suggested interpretations require reconsideration. This issue
will be discussed in further detail in Section 4 of this article.
The second aspect of the decision in Gay Choon Ing that calls for clarifica-
tion concerns the continued relevance of Projection’s endorsement of Lord
Denning’s approach. In affirming the traditional approach over Lord
48Gay Choon Ing (n 33) [77].
49Gay Choon Ing (n 33) [63], referring to The Master Stelios [1982–1983] SLR 39 (Singapore Privy Council)
and Pac-Asian Service Pte Ltd v Westburne International Drilling Ltd [1986] SLR 390 (Singapore High Court
(SGHC)).
50Gay Choon Ing (n 33) [61]–[62].
51Gay Choon Ing (n 33) [63].
52Gay Choon Ing (n 33) [52], citing Gibson (HL) (n 8) 297.
53Gay Choon Ing (n 33) [63] (emphasis in original, internal citation omitted).
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Denning’s approach, the SGCA in Gay Choon Ing notably did not refer to the
case of Projection. This has resulted in two potentially inconsistent SGCA auth-
orities. It remains unclear whether Lord Denning’s approach has been unequi-
vocally rejected in favour of the traditional approach or whether it remains
open to courts to choose between both approaches as alternatives; if the
latter holds true, then the uncertainties raised by Projection still require resol-
ution. Further, this raises the question of what courts should do in the event
that both approaches lead to conflicting outcomes.
3.3. Continuing confusion pre- and post-Gay Choon Ing
Following Projection, the Singapore courts have demonstrated inconsistencies
in articulating and applying Lord Denning’s approach, both pre- and post-Gay
Choon Ing.
In several decisions, the courts have articulated that Lord Denning’s
approach should apply to protracted negotiations, but have then incongru-
ently analysed the facts using the traditional approach.54 Indeed, the SGHC
in Lim Koon Park v Yap Jin Meng Bryan55 curiously suggested a ‘modified’ tra-
ditional approach in continuing negotiations, ie ‘an objective test will be
applied, albeit with some modifications to the traditional analysis of offer
and acceptance’, although this was unnecessary given that Gay Choon Ing
had already endorsed the traditional approach.56 On appeal, the SGCA did
not comment on the correctness of the ‘modified’ traditional approach, but
cited a passage from Edwin Peel (ed), Treitel on the Law of Contract (13th
edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2011)57 (Treitel) which was the equivalent passage
from Chitty on Contracts 1994 that had been referred to in Projection.58
Leading Singapore commentators have suggested that the SGCA’s endorse-
ment of the passage from Treitel raises the issue of whether Lord Denning’s
approach or the traditional approach should be applied in continuing nego-
tiations.59 These commentators answer this question by referring to Gay
Choon Ing for the position that the traditional approach should apply,
although there may be no real difference between the traditional approach
and Lord Denning’s approach. They also comment that the SGCA’s endorse-
ment of the passage in Treitel ‘seems to suggest that it is indeed difficult to
draw a sensible distinction between the traditional approach and Lord
54Overseas Union Insurance Ltd v Turegum Insurance Co [2001] SGHC 147; Smartbus Pte Ltd v Yeap
Transport [2011] SGHC 129 (Smartbus); Lim Koon Park v Yap Jin Meng Bryan [2012] SGHC 159
(SGHC) (Lim Koon Park No 1 (SGHC)); [2013] SGCA 41 (Lim Koon Park No 2 (SGCA)).
55Lim Koon Park No 1 (SGHC) (n 54).
56Chee Ho Tham, Pey Woan Lee and Yihan Goh, ‘Contract Law’ (2012) 13 Singapore Academy of Law
Annual Review of Singapore Cases 182 para 12.7.
57Edwin Peel (ed), Treitel on the Law of Contract (13th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2011) para 2-017.
58Projection (n 32) [18].
59Chee Ho Tham, Pey Woan Lee and Yihan Goh, ‘Contract Law’ (2013) 14 Singapore Academy of Law
Annual Review of Singapore Cases 221 para 12.5.
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Denning’s approach’.60 With respect, the difficulties identified above do not
arise if this article’s proposed interpretation of the equivalent passage from
Chitty on Contracts 1994 is adopted, namely that the passage does not
mark a departure from the traditional approach but merely clarifies that a
court must look at the whole correspondence in applying the traditional
approach. If so, the SGCA’s present endorsement of the passage in Treitel
does not indicate its validation of Lord Denning’s approach. On this view, it
is also difficult to see why affirming that passage should indicate that it is
hard to draw a distinction between both approaches.
The ambiguity post-Projection was also apparent in a different scenario in
Asirham Investment Pte Ltd v JSI Shipping (S) Pte Ltd61 (Asirham Investment). The
parties had signed a tenancy agreement and the issue was whether the
signed agreement was valid and binding. The learned judge cited Projection
for Lord Denning’s approach and held that the tenancy agreement was
valid and enforceable since it contained all the material terms.62 It is not
entirely clear why or how Lord Denning’s approach was used to arrive at
the decision. Given that there was a signed agreement, there was no need
for the Court to employ Lord Denning’s approach (or, for that matter, the tra-
ditional approach) to deduce the existence of that agreement, even if the
signed agreement may have arisen from protracted discussions; where
parties have reduced their agreement to writing, the written agreement is
‘the sole and almost conclusive proof of their agreement’63 and any formation
issue in dispute usually relates only to certainty or completeness.64 It could be
that the Court had applied Lord Denning’s approach not to determine the
existence of the agreement, which was clear, but to determine whether the
terms of agreement were sufficiently complete and certain for the agreement
to be valid and binding. Alternatively, Lord Denning’s approach may have
been used to determine both the existence and validity of agreement. In
any case, Asirham Investment appears to extend the application of Lord Den-
ning’s approach beyond what may originally have been contemplated in
Projection.65
Most recently, in Sintalow Hardware Pte Ltd v OSK Engineering Pte Ltd,66 the
plaintiff contended that ‘the court should adopt a holistic approach in consid-
ering the conduct of the parties over the period during which negotiations
took place rather than insisting on clear-cut evidence of offer and
60Tham, Lee and Goh (n 56) para 12.5.
61[2007] SGHC 171 (SGHC).
62Asirham Investment (n 61) [10].
63Yock Lin Tan, ‘Writing and Signature in the Constitution and Proof of Contracts’ [2003] Singapore Journal
of Legal Studies 333, 337.
64Michael Furmston and G J Tolhurst, Contract Formation: Law and Practice (OUP 2010) para 1.19.
65This point is further discussed under Subsection 4.2 below.
66[2016] SGHC 104.
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acceptance’.67 The plaintiffs’ submission presented a false dichotomy that the
learned judge did not address herself to even though it ought to have been
clear, post-Gay Choon Ing, that the holistic approach is not an alternative to
the traditional analysis of offer and acceptance, but provides the context in
which to apply this analysis.
4. Evaluation of the law
The present state of the law in Singapore regarding the test for formation in
continuing negotiations cases can be stated thus. The incorporation of Lord
Denning’s approach in Singapore law by the SGCA in Projection introduced
considerable uncertainty into the law governing contract formation. In Gay
Choon Ing, the SGCA took steps towards clarifying the law by signalling a judi-
cial preference for the traditional approach. However, the SGCA’s comment
that Lord Denning’s approach and the traditional approach are the ‘same in
substance’ encourages one to think that the two approaches are not materi-
ally different, and perhaps even can be used interchangeably. With respect,
the present state of Singapore law does not accurately reflect the distinctions
between the two approaches, and introduces uncertainty as to the continued
validity of Lord Denning’s approach. This can create confusion with regard to
the applicable approach to determine the existence of an agreement in con-
tinuing negotiations cases.
In the following subsections, this article will argue that, in contrast to the
view of the SGCA in Gay Choon Ing, the two approaches are distinct from
each other both conceptually and practically. Since the approaches are dis-
tinct, the question arises as to which approach should be preferred. To
answer this question, this article assesses both approaches comparatively,
with regard to factors such as commercial certainty, ability to uphold
parties’ intentions, and coherence with principles of contract law, and
suggests that several cogent reasons exist for preferring the traditional
approach over Lord Denning’s approach. For completeness, this article will
also survey several alternative solutions to the difficulties of finding agree-
ment in contract formation and offer observations on their applicability to Sin-
gapore law.
4.1. Conceptually distinct tests for the existence of an identifiable
agreement
The first point to be made is that both approaches are distinct as to the nature
and extent to which parties’ assent to the same terms is required for agree-
ment to be found. The traditional approach imposes a legal test that requires
67Sintalow Hardware (n 66) [18].
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coincidence of offer and acceptance for an agreement to exist. To satisfy this
test, there must be a final and unqualified assent to the terms of an offer; an
attempt to accept an offer on new terms not contained in the offer may be a
rejection accompanied by a counter-offer.68 In contrast, Lord Denning’s
approach considers whether the parties have reached agreement upon all
material terms. Even if one party rejects certain terms or counter-proposes
terms, parties are bound as long as they are found to have consented to
the terms that are considered material. This departure from the ‘mirror
image’ rule would have deleterious effects on legal and commercial certainty,
and has been criticised as giving too little guidance to lawyers and judges
regarding how to determine the existence of an agreement.69
The main difficulty lies in the lack of clarity as to what constitute ‘material
points’ which must be agreed upon for a contract to be formed under Lord
Denning’s approach, and what constitute residual terms that do not have
an effect on contract formation and may be replaced through reasonable
implication by the courts. Notably, Lord Denning himself did not address
the core question of how such ‘material points’ should be identified. Such cat-
egorisation of terms has been described as ‘arbitrary and liable to produce
much litigation’.70 Its open-ended nature can also leave judges vulnerable
to accusations of backward reasoning, as it may lead to the perception that
judges can adjust their interpretation of the documents to achieve the
results they deem desirable.71 It is suggested that a possible way to determine
what is ‘material’ under Lord Denning’s approach is to apply the same
threshold that governs certainty and completeness under the traditional
approach, ie an agreement will not be regarded as a binding contract if essen-
tial matters, without which the contract is too uncertain or incomplete to be
workable, remain to be agreed upon.72 Another possible alternative would be
the method adopted by the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods (CISG), which identifies as material terms relating
to price, payment, quantity and quality of the goods, place and time of deliv-
ery and the extent of liability of one party to the other. Applying either alterna-
tive, a case could well be made that in Butler Machine the price variation clause
was sufficiently material such that there should have been no finding of a con-
tract, given that the parties were not agreed as to the term of price.73 After all,
68Beale (n 7) paras 2-026, 2-031, 2-097.
69Ewan McKendrick, ‘The Battle of the Forms and the Law of Restitution’ (1988) 8(2) Oxford Journal of
Legal Studies 197, 198.
70Rick Rawlings, ‘The Battle of Forms’ (1979) 42(6) The Modern Law Review 715, 719; François Vergne, ‘The
“Battle of the Forms” under the 1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale
of Goods’ (1985) 33(2) The American Journal of Comparative Law 233, 243.
71Edward J Jacobs, ‘The Battle of the Forms: Standard Term Contracts in Comparative Perspective’ (1985)
34(2) The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 297, 303. See also Stone (n 28).
72Norwest Holdings Pte Ltd (in liquidation) v Newport Mining Ltd [2010] SGHC 144 [28].
73On the other hand, it been suggested that a distinction may be drawn between the initial agreement to
price as a material point and a price variation clause as a non-material point: McKendrick (n 18) 87.
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Lord Denning considered that if the difference in terms is so material that it
would affect the price, then the buyer ought not to be allowed to take advan-
tage of the difference unless he draws it specifically to the attention of the
seller.74
In contrast, the traditional approach has the advantage of abundant case
law and commentaries to clarify the nuances of applying it in different con-
texts. Its chief merit has been described as its ability to provide ‘a degree of
certainty which is both desirable and necessary in order to promote commer-
cial relationships’.75 The English courts have also acknowledged the continued
applicability of the traditional approach in cases which do not appear immedi-
ately amenable to such an analysis, for the sake of achieving certainty of prin-
ciple.76 Commentators have argued that this clarity is achieved at the expense
of flexibility, which is particularly problematic in continuing negotiations
cases, where it is difficult to identify a clear instance of offer and acceptance.77
However, as has been emphasised by the SGCA in Gay Choon Ing, the tra-
ditional offer and acceptance analysis can and should be applied in a
context-sensitive manner to do justice in such cases.
4.2. Conflation of the existence of an agreement with certainty and
completeness of its terms
The second distinction between both approaches lies in the relationship
between the existence of an agreement and its certainty and completeness.
It is well-established that the agreed termsmust be sufficiently certain and com-
plete for an agreement to amount to a binding contract.78 As such, ‘unless all
the material terms of the contract are agreed there is no binding agreement’.79
Under the traditional approach, it is after an identifiable agreement has
been found that the court considers whether the material terms have been
agreed upon such that the contract is certain and complete.
On the other hand, the focus in Lord Denning’s approach on determining
upfront if there is agreement upon all material terms appears to conflate the
determination of the existence of an agreement with the certainty and
74Butler Machine (n 6) 405.
75Tekdata (n 8) [25] (Dyson LJ).
76Virulite LLC v Virulite Distribution Ltd and another [2014] EWHC 366 (QB). The English courts have also
applied the traditional approach in a flexible manner: see Hyde v Wrench (1840) 3 Beav 334, 49 ER
132 (QB); Felthouse v Bindley (1862) 11 CB (NS) 869, 142 ER 1037; Brogden v Metropolitan Railway Co
(1877), 2 App Cas 666 (UKHL); Stevenson, Jacques, & Co v McLean (1880) 5 QBD 346. See also M H
Ogilvie, ‘Surely the Next to Last Shot in the Battle of the Forms!’ (2011) 51 Canadian Business Law
Journal 307, 313.
77Stephens, ‘Escape from the Battle of the Forms’ (n 12) 239.
78Peel 2015 (n 29) para 2-078: ‘An agreement is not a binding contract if it lacks certainty, either because it
is too vague or because it is obviously incomplete.’
79Foley v Classique Coaches Ltd [1934] 2 KB 1 (UKCA) (Foley) 13, cited with approval in Grossner Jens v
Raffles Holdings Ltd [2003] SGHC 290 [14], Smartbus (n 54) [43], Rudhra Minerals Pte Ltd v MRI Trading
Pte Ltd (formerly known as CWT Integrated Services Pte Ltd) [2013] SGHC 187 [32]; Harwindar Singh s/o
Geja Singh v Wong Lok Yung Michael [2015] SGHC 132 [14].
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completeness of its terms. The decision in Asirham Investment discussed above
certainly suggests that Lord Denning’s approach was applied to decide the
existence of agreement together with the certainty and completeness of its
terms.80 Such a conflation sits uneasily with existing legal principles which
allow the courts to rectify contracts that satisfy the element of agreement
but are incomplete or vague.81 Reconciling this body of case law with Lord
Denning’s approach is problematic—how does one identify in Lord Denning’s
approach whether an agreement exists which can be ‘cured’ by the courts?
Applying Lord Denning’s approach to determine whether there has been
agreement on all material terms merely begs the question as to the comple-
teness of the material terms. Such conceptual difficulties do not exist under
the traditional approach, under which the existence of an agreement will
first be determined before considering the certainty and completeness of
its terms. Thus, clarity of analysis and legal principle lean towards the tra-
ditional approach in this respect.
4.3. Potential to lead to different outcomes
As to the practical differences, it is suggested that both approaches in fact
have significant potential to lead to opposite outcomes—although even if
the approaches are said to generate similar outcomes, it is important to be
aware of the underlying conceptual differences in order for the law in this
area to be developed and rationalised on a principled basis.
The decisions in Gibson (CA) and Gibson (HL) briefly referred to above82
provide such an example. The facts were that the council initially decided to
allow tenants to purchase houses but later reversed its policy. Prior to the rever-
sal, the council had sent a letter with instructions to Mr Gibson to return an
enclosed application form if he wanted to make a formal application to buy
the house. Mr Gibson returned the form duly completed except for the pur-
chase price which was left blank. Before the form was processed, the council
reversed their policy. The dispute was whether Mr Gibson and the council
had entered into a binding contract. The majority of the CA held that there
was a concluded contract. Lord Denning MR, who was in the majority,
applied his broad approach and found that the correspondence between the
parties, together with their subsequent conduct, showed that parties had
agreed to all material terms and had intended the agreement to be binding.83
80See Subsection 3.3 above.
81Noteworthy cases which reflect these principles include G Percy Trentham Ltd v Archital Luxfer Ltd (1993)
1 Lloyd’s Rep 25 (UKCA); Nicolene Ltd v Simmonds (1953) 1 QB 543 (UKCA); Foley (n 79); Hillas (WN) & Co
Ltd v Arcos Ltd (1932) 43 Lloyd’s Law Rep 359 (UKHL).
82See Subsections 2.2 and 2.3 above.
83Gibson (CA) (n 6) 523–25 (Lord Denning). The other majority judge, Omrod LJ, adopted a similar
approach to Lord Denning, although the learned judge also looked at the matter using the offer and
acceptance analysis and arrived at the same conclusion.
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The CA’s decision was reversed on appeal to the HL. Lord Diplock, deliver-
ing the leading judgment, disagreed forcefully with Lord Denning’s approach
and held that the traditional approach should apply. Notably, Lord Diplock
pronounced rather severely that ‘it was by departing from this conventional
approach that the majority of the CA was led into error’.84 Applying the tra-
ditional analysis, it was held that the council’s letter was worded in a
manner that did not amount to an offer and thus could not possibly be
accepted to form a legally binding contract.85 Therefore there was no
binding contract.
Projection itself provides another illustration. Returning to the facts of that
case, the SGCA applied Lord Denning’s approach to find a valid compromise
agreement on the basis that the insurer’s letter (which offered to pay the sum
earlier sought by the insured at oral negotiations) showed that parties had
reached a compromise on the settlement amount to be paid. However, the
outcome may well have been different if the traditional approach had been
used. While much depends on the precise facts and evidence, if the insured’s
request was characterised as an offer that had been rejected by the insurer’s
unwillingness to assent at the negotiations, there would have been no stand-
ing offer capable of being accepted by the insurer’s subsequent letter and
therefore no agreement.
4.4. Adopting Lord Denning’s approach—wider implications for
contract law
Accepting Lord Denning’s approach may have wider implications than
expected for contract law in general. It is difficult to see what principled
reason justifies applying different tests of agreement to continuing nego-
tiation situations and regular negotiation cases. The distinction between the
two is arguably a matter of difference in degree and not a difference in
kind. Certainly, some continuing negotiations cases are amenable to the tra-
ditional offer and acceptance analysis. The hazy boundaries between both
cases exacerbate the inherent ambiguity of Lord Denning’s approach and
the danger of excessive judicial latitude. For instance, on the facts of Projec-
tion, the negotiations between parties were not so lengthy or complicated
that it was difficult to analyse the correspondence using the traditional
approach. This leads one to query whether the SGCA’s willingness to apply
Lord Denning’s approach was prompted by a desire to find agreement
where both parties had assented to the same settlement figure, and where
an application of the traditional approach may not have achieved the same
result. In this vein, it should also be pointed out that Lord Denning’s judgment
84Gibson (HL) (n 8) 297.
85Gibson (HL) (n 8) 302.
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in Gibson (CA),86 where the learned judge applied his broader approach, has
been criticised thus: ‘In the range of possible negotiations Gibson was well
towards the simple end. Lord Denning’s judgment reflects a feeling that coun-
cils should not behave like this. But if that is to stand it needs a quite different
conceptual basis.’87
Further, it must be noted that Lord Denning, in espousing his approach, did
not confine it to the narrow category of continuing negotiations cases—
indeed Butler Machine itself was not such a case. Rather, Lord Denning’s
approach was quite clearly intended to apply generally in contract law. This
was probably the reason for caution that ‘such an outright rejection of the tra-
ditional analysis is open to the objection that it provides too little guidance for
the courts (or for their parties or for their legal advisers) in determining
whether an agreement has been reached’.88 As a result, accepting Lord
Denning’s approach may entail the abandonment of a substantial body of
jurisprudence regarding the formation of contracts—a body of law that has
been carefully refined through the contribution of decades of judicial
wisdom and legal scholarship.
However, overturning an established body of jurisprudence is not an insur-
mountable obstacle and, indeed, ought to be undertaken if there exist suffi-
ciently cogent and principled reasons for doing so. On behalf of Lord
Denning, it may be argued that the traditional approach disappoints
parties’ expectations by assigning implicit assumptions about their intentions
which may not accord with their actual intentions, and by ignoring the actual
meeting of their minds.89 In the battle of the forms context, for example,
parties may be surprised to find out that the entirety of their contract is con-
tained in the standard terms of the ‘last shot’ fired, rendering their prior
exchanges nugatory. Such results may be contrary to business expectations
and ignorant of the modern realities of commerce, where continuing nego-
tiations are often conducted without strictly heeding the technical concepts
of offer and acceptance. Consequently, an argument may be made in
favour of a more fluid approach alive to commercial realities in contract for-
mation, as compared to an approach requiring the mechanistic application
of technical rules.90 Thus when faced with situations that potentially are not
86Gibson (HL) (n 8).
87Furmston and Tolhurst, Contract Formation: Law and Practice (n 64) para 2.11 (emphasis added). See also
Michael Furmston, Cheshire, Fifoot & Furmston’s Law of Contract (16th edn, OUP 2012) 87–93 on various
other steps that may be employed by the courts to address problems arising in inchoate contracts.
88Beale (n 7) para 2-118.
89Giesela Ruhl, ‘The Battle of the Forms: Comparative and Economic Observations’ (2003) 24 University of
Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law 189; Stephens, ‘Escape from the Battle of the Forms’
(n 12); Corneill A Stephens, ‘On Ending the Battle of the Forms: Problems with Solutions‘ (1991–1992) 80
Kentucky Law Journal 815; Andre Corterier, ‘A Peace Plan for the Battle of the Forms’ (2006) 10 Inter-
national Trade & Business Law Review 195.
90A similar trend may be observed in the context of the doctrine of consideration as well. See MWB
Business Exchange Centres v Rock Advertising Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 553.
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amenable to an offer and acceptance analysis to find agreement, it is indeed
tempting to conclude that the traditional approach is not capable of accom-
modating the concerns of commercial realities and upholding parties’ inten-
tions within the framework of offer and acceptance rules, without doing
violence to these rules. However, it is suggested that caution must be taken
to maintain a proper perspective. The offer and acceptance framework is
easily applicable in the majority of cases—indeed, as has been pointed out
above, the facts in Gibson and Projection were sufficiently simple to be ana-
lysed within the traditional framework—and it is only in exceptional situations
that the traditional approach finds difficulties in application. Overhauling the
doctrine of offer and acceptance in response to the difficulties of applying the
traditional approach in certain limited situations would appear to be a dispro-
portionate response.
In specific situations where it may be difficult to determine agreement
through an offer and acceptance analysis, such as in particularly complicated
continuing negotiations cases, it is suggested that the better approach would
be to view such situations as exceptions to the general rule.91 Such was the
approach taken by the CA in Tekdata. The facts of Tekdata gave rise to a
classic battle of the forms scenario—a situation usually hostile to the appli-
cation of the offer and acceptance approach. Tekdata Interconnections Ltd
purchased connectors from Amphenol Ltd. Tekdata Interconnections Ltd sub-
sequently claimed that certain connectors were delivered late and were not fit
for the purpose or of merchantable quality, thus breaching the terms of their
contract, which they submitted to be based on the purchase order terms. In
response, Amphenol Ltd argued that their contract was based on the terms
contained in their acknowledgement of the purchase order, which excluded
or limited their liability for any breach of contract. At first instance, it was
found that on the traditional offer and acceptance analysis, a contract
would have come into existence upon Amphenol Ltd’s acknowledgement
of the purchase. If no other documents passed between the parties, and if
Tekdata Interconnections Ltd took delivery of the connectors, the contract
would thus be on Amphenol Ltd’s terms. However, due to various countervail-
ing factors, the judge held that the parties had always intended Tekdata Inter-
connections Ltd’s terms to apply, and found that the contract between the
parties was based on those terms.
Amphenol Ltd appealed the decision to the CA where Longmore LJ
affirmed the traditional approach as the default analysis for contract for-
mation. Notably, however, he accepted that the traditional approach could
be displaced if the documents passing between the parties and their
91See also Stone (n 28) which suggests that the traditional analysis will be favoured where there is a clear
trail of correspondence but that Lord Denning’s more flexible analysis is to be adopted in more complex
cases, particularly where negotiations are not in writing.
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conduct show that they intended some other terms to apply.92 Should the tra-
ditional offer and acceptance approach be displaced, the court must then
consider the documents exchanged and the overall conduct of the parties
to determine if there has been an agreement, and on what terms. Emphasis-
ing that it would be very difficult to displace the traditional approach, Long-
more LJ reiterated the uncertainty involved in abandoning the traditional
analysis, and added that there must be a clear course of dealing between
the parties for the traditional analysis to be displaced.93 Applying the law to
the facts, it was held that the present case did not provide sufficient reason
to displace the traditional approach, and that it was correct to use the tra-
ditional approach to resolve the case. As a result, the CA allowed the
appeal, holding that the contract between the parties was on Amphenol
Ltd’s terms.
The effect of the decision in Tekdata is to characterise Lord Denning’s
approach as an exception to the traditional approach, only to apply in the
exceptional situation where the parties have displayed an objective
common intention through a clear course of dealing to displace the tra-
ditional offer and acceptance analysis and apply some other terms to their
agreement.94 This approach has merits which commend itself over the
present ambiguity in Singapore law on this issue. First, Tekdata acknowledges
the conceptual differences between Lord Denning’s approach and the tra-
ditional approach, which is abundantly clear from the CA’s characterisation
of Lord Denning’s approach as an exception to the traditional approach,
rather than being substantially similar to the traditional approach. Second,
Tekdata sets out a clear position regarding the relationship between Lord
Denning’s approach and the traditional approach, enhancing legal clarity as
to the scope of application for each approach. Third, and crucially, Tekdata’s
approach establishes the traditional offer and acceptance approach as the
default framework for the courts to determine the existence of agreement,
but allows for the application of a broader analysis should the parties’ inten-
tions clearly point against a result which would be arrived at through the
traditional approach. This targeted approach to specific situations would
strike a desirable balance between certainty in the regulation of business
relationships and flexibility to do justice to parties’ intentions, rather than
upending the law of contract formation as Lord Denning’s approach other-
wise would.
As a side note, it may be argued that an issue with Tekdata’s approach is
that its provision for a course of dealing or other documents passing
between the parties to vary the terms of the written contract may conflict
92Tekdata (n 8) [11].
93Tekdata (n 8) [21].
94Ogilvie (n 76) 313.
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with evidentiary rules that restrict the admissibility of evidence prior to or sub-
sequent to the agreement to vary the terms of the contract.95 In Singapore
law, this restriction applies with particular force if the contract in question is
a standard form or commercial contract.96 However, the SGCA has allowed
the courts to look at extrinsic evidence to determine whether the parties
intended to embody their entire agreement in a written contract, subject to
a presumption that ‘a contract which is complete on its face was intended
to contain all the terms of the parties’ agreement’.97 This extrinsic evidence
can include prior negotiations and subsequent conduct, as long as the evi-
dence is ‘relevant, reasonably available to all the contracting parties, and
relates to a clear or obvious context’.98 Although the SGCA has opined that
such evidence will generally be inadmissible due to a failure to meet these
three requirements,99 it is possible that exceptional circumstances such as
those described in Tekdata may justify the admission of such evidence.
4.5. Alternative approaches
For completeness, it is worth noting that a variety of solutions have been
offered to address the difficulties in applying the traditional approach, particu-
larly in battle of the forms situations. One is a slight modification of the tra-
ditional approach—the framework of offer and acceptance remains
generally applicable, except that a distinction is drawn between material
and non-material modifications. As an example of this approach, the CISG
allows replies that are not identical to the terms of the offer to be construed
as valid acceptances, provided that the modifications do not materially alter
the terms of the offer.100 Modifications relating to price, payment, quantity
and quality of the goods, place and time of delivery and the extent of liability
of one party to the other are considered to be material under the CISG.
Another alternative solution has been characterised as the ‘knock-out’ sol-
ution, which is encapsulated in the approach taken by the UNIDROIT Prin-
ciples of International Commercial Contracts (UNIDROIT Principles)—a
contract is deemed to be concluded on the basis of the agreed terms, and
any terms differing between the offer and acceptance are eliminated from
95Evidence Act (Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed) ss 93 and 94. See Prenn v Simmonds [1971] 3 All ER 237 (UKHL) 240
for justifications for this position.
96Zurich Insurance (Singapore) Pte Ltd v B-Gold Interior Design & Construction Pte Ltd [2008] SGCA 27 [132
(a)].
97Zurich Insurance (n 96) [132(b)]. The UK position is moving closer to this position as well, as exemplified
in Chartbrook Ltd and another v Persimmon Homes Ltd and another [2009] UKHL 38 [33].
98Zurich Insurance (n 96) [132(d)], cited in Goh Guan Chong v AspenTech Inc [2009] SGHC 73 [55]–[57].
99Zurich Insurance (n 96) [132(d)].
100Art 19(2), United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 1489 UNTS (1988)
(CISG). Notably, the CISG has force of law in Singapore through the Sale of Goods (United Nations Con-
vention) Act. Contracts falling under the scope of the CISG will be governed by this approach, unless the
parties expressly exclude the application of the CISG.
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the concluded contract.101 The US Uniform Commercial Code can be said to
have adopted a similar solution as well.102 Yet another solution is the ‘first
shot’ approach. As an illustration, Article 6:225(3) of the Dutch Civil Code pro-
vides that where there are two references to standard terms, the second refer-
ence is ineffective unless it explicitly rejects the terms in the first.103 This
effectively means that in a battle of the forms scenario, the content of the con-
tract will be determined by the terms in the ‘first shot’. A leading commentator
has also suggested a ‘best shot’ rule as the ideal solution to incentivise con-
tracting parties to take into account the opposing parties’ concerns and
move towards the fairest position.104
The comparative merits of these approaches have been the subject of a
considerable body of literature,105 and given that the present discussion
focuses on the relationship between the traditional approach and Lord Den-
ning’s approach in continuing negotiations cases, a detailed evaluation of
their merits falls beyond the scope of this article. Nevertheless, this article
will venture the following observations. First, it should be noted that these
approaches are applicable only to the specific situation of battle of the
forms. Second, to the extent that some of these approaches would involve
a far-reaching revision of contract law in Singapore (eg the approach
suggested by the UNIDROIT Principles), it is suggested that even if such
approaches should be deemed desirable for incorporation in Singapore law
as an exception to the traditional rule in battle of the forms situations, it
would be more appropriate to do so via legislative action rather than by judi-
cial pronouncement. Third, these alternative approaches generally offer the
chief merit of increased flexibility in the application of the rules of offer and
acceptance, affording judges the ability to do justice to the agreement
between the parties without being constrained by legal technicalities. The
flexibility of these approaches also prevents parties seeking to escape a bad
bargain from relying on immaterial inconsistencies to argue that there is no
valid contract between the parties due to a failure of offer and acceptance.
Although the Singapore courts have not explicitly adopted these approaches,
it is suggested that applying the traditional approach with a cognisance of
context, and allowing the traditional approach to be displaced by a broader
101Art 2.22, International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT), Principles of International
Commercial Contracts (1994). See also Ruhl (n 89) 207.
102United States Uniform Commercial Code § 2-207. See also Victor P Goldberg, ‘The “Battle of the Forms”:
Fairness, Efficiency, and the Best Shot Rule’ (1997) 76 Oregon Law Review 155, 160.
103Dutch Civil Code, Article 6:225(3) of Book 6. See also Nicole Kornet, ‘Contracting in China: Comparative
Observations on Freedom of Contract, Contract Formation, Battle of Forms and Standard Form Contracts’
(7 February 2011) Maastricht European Private Law Institute Working Paper No 2011/06 <ssrn.com/
abstract=1756750> accessed 28 February 2017.
104Goldberg (n 102) 166–71.
105John E Murray Jr, ‘The Definitive “Battle of the Forms”: Chaos Revisited’ (2000–2001) 20 Journal of Law &
Commerce 1; Ruhl (n 89); Ogilvie (n 76); Rawlings (n 70); Vergne (n 70); Stephens, ‘Escape from the Battle
of the Forms’ (n 12).
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assessment of parties’ intentions in exceptional situations, will achieve a
similar result without necessitating a substantial alteration of the jurispru-
dence on contract formation in Singapore.
Finally, it is suggested that one’s view of the nature of objectivity in con-
tractual formation may influence the approach one finds most persuasive
to resolve the difficulties of finding offer and acceptance in continuing nego-
tiations. It may be worth touching on this although it is not the focus of this
article. The principle of objectivity can be traced back to the English case of
Smith v Hughes106 and has been affirmed by the SGCA on various occasions,107
most recently in R1 International Pte Ltd v Lonstroff AG, where it was held that
‘the law adopts an objective approach towards questions of contract for-
mation and the incorporation of terms’.108
In the prevailing academic literature, there are differing views as to what
exactly the ‘objective’ approach entails. The orthodox view accepted in the
Singapore courts can be described as ‘promisee objectivity’, which calls for
an objective evaluation of the promisor’s conduct and statements from the
point of view of a reasonable person in the promisee’s position.109 Although
it is evidently impossible for the courts to determine what the parties’ real
subjective intentions are, the courts remain concerned with discerning a
reasonable interpretation of the promisor’s actual intentions. However, in
the context of contractual interpretation, Sir George Leggatt has recently
argued in an extra-judicial capacity that how the courts have actually
applied the objective approach in practice is to interpret contractual docu-
ments ‘as having the meaning which best explains why rational parties who
were using the language of the contract to express a shared intention
would have chosen that language’.110 On this stronger view of objectivity,
the relevance of the parties’ own intentions is diminished, since an interpret-
ation of the contract does not depend on what the parties actually meant, or
what a reasonable person would have understood the parties to mean when
the contract was made. This formulation of objectivity is potentially equally
applicable to the context of contract formation as well.
To an adherent of the orthodox view of objectivity, an approach closely
connected to determining a reasonable interpretation of the parties’ actual
intentions would likely be more convincing. The traditional approach, with
its focus on an objective interpretation of what the parties actually intended,
can be described as an example of such an approach. On the other hand,
106(1871) LR 6 QB 597.
107Zurich Insurance (n 96) [125]–[126]; Bakery Mart Pte Ltd (in receivership) v Sincere Watch Ltd [2003] SGCA
36; Projection (n 32); Tribune Investment Trust (n 1) [39]–[40].
108[2014] SGCA 56 [51].
109Tribune Investment Trust (n 1) [39]–[40]; Chia Ee Lin Evelyn v Teh Guek Ngor Engelin nee Tan [2005] SGCA
19; Phang (n 2) para 03.006–03.014.
110George Leggatt, ‘Making Sense of Contracts: the Rational Choice Theory’ (2015) 131 Law Quarterly
Review 454, 475.
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adherents of Leggatt’s stronger view of objectivity in contractual interpret-
ation are likely to be drawn towards contract formation approaches which
are more akin to an evaluation of what rational people who wanted to
express a shared intention would have intended their language and
conduct to convey. Approaches such as the ‘knock out’ rule and the ‘best
shot’ rule would fall under this category, to the extent that they involve a
value judgment of what rational parties would have intended in such circum-
stances, which may be divorced from the parties’ actual intentions.
5. Conclusion—the way forward for Singapore law
This article’s examination of the development of Singapore case law shows
that the influence of Lord Denning’s approach on contractual formation in
continuing negotiations cases has waxed and waned with the evolution
of Singapore jurisprudence. What remains constant is that the contractual
principles underpinning the traditional approach and Lord Denning’s
approach, as well as the interaction between both approaches, have been
plagued by inconsistencies and murky legal reasoning over the near-two
decades since Projection, which remain unresolved. While Gay Choon Ing
was an important move towards a clarification of the law, the failure to
draw a distinction between both approaches gave rise to uncertainty as
to the continued impact of Lord Denning’s approach on contract law in
Singapore.
This article has argued that the traditional approach and Lord Denning’s
approach to contract formation are distinct both conceptually and practically.
In view of the distinctions between the two approaches, and with a view to
the comparative development of English law, it has been suggested that
the traditional approach is to be preferred. While Lord Denning’s approach
has the advantage of flexibility and ability to discern agreement in situations
not amenable to the traditional offer and acceptance analysis, the traditional
approach has the key advantages of certainty and coherence with principle.
Thus it is suggested that the best way forward for the progression of Singa-
pore law is to adopt the traditional approach as the default approach to con-
tract formation in continuing negotiations cases—as the Singapore courts
have done in regular negotiation cases—while according the courts a
measure of discretion to displace the traditional approach in favour of a
broader inquiry into the parties’ intentions to determine the existence of
agreement in exceptional circumstances.
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